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Abstract
We obtain rich measures of the risk preferences of a sample of Vietnamese farm-
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thus more risk tolerant than typical Western subject populations. This generalises
recent findings indicating that students in poorer countries are more risk tolerant
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1 Introduction
Development economists have long discussed the link between poverty and risk aversion.
On the one hand, people in developing countries in general have been depicted as very
risk averse (see e.g. Haushofer and Fehr, 2014, for a recent literature review). Such
risk aversion may then lead to the perpetuation of poverty, by inducing suboptimal,
risk-averse behavior (Liu, 2012; Liu and Huang, 2013). The evidence on both counts
is, however, less than uniform. On the one hand, the supposed correlation between risk
preferences and economic well-being cannot always be replicated (see e.g. Cardenas and
Carpenter, 2013). On the other, tasks used to measure risk preferences in the developing
world are often specifically designed to pick up pronounced risk aversion, and thus make
the findings difficult to compare to preferences measured in developed countries using
different elicitation tasks. In the presence of random switching, such measurement tasks
will furthermore systematically over-estimate risk aversion (Vieider, 2018).
In this paper, we take a fresh look at the relation between risk preferences and
economic well-being. We obtain a rich set of experimental measures of risk preferences
for a randomly selected, geographically confined group of farmers in Vietnam. The
measures are obtained using certainty equivalents, which are easy to understand and
administer. They also allow us to compare the results to a large number of experiments
that have used the same type of tasks in the West (e.g., Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido
and Wakker, 2011; Fehr-Duda and Epper, 2012), and to recent comparative data across
a large number of countries obtained with students (Vieider, Lefebvre, Bouchouicha,
Chmura, Hakimov, Krawczyk and Martinsson, 2015). The richness of the data allows us
to separate preferences from noise using structural models, while at the same time we
can back up the findings with nonparametric data. Using a geographically confined and
uniform sample allows us to obtain good and comparable income measures, which are
not confounded by other differences across subject groups or geographical regions.
We show that—far from conforming to the stereotype of extreme risk aversion—our
Vietnamese farmers are on average risk neutral (although preferences change system-
atically across task characteristics). Comparing their risk preferences to data obtained
with other subject populations using the same experimental tasks to put the findings
in perspective, we conclude that Vietnamese farmers are significantly less risk averse
than American students, which serve but as an example of other student populations
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in the West. We also find the Vietnamese farmers to be slightly more risk averse than
Vietnamese students. Once again, this finding is consistent with previous findings from
the West, with for instance Fehr-Duda and Epper (2012) finding Swiss students to be
less risk averse than the Swiss general population using tasks similar to ours.
The evidence we present is also highly consistent with recent findings of students
in poorer countries being more risk tolerant than students in richer countries (Rieger,
Wang and Hens, 2014; Vieider et al., 2015), and thus extends the finding from students
to a general population sample. At the same time, we find a strong negative correlation
between risk aversion and income amongst farmers (while finding no correlation with
other measures of well-being, such as wealth). The evidence here presented thus fits
the narrative of a risk-income paradox presented by Bouchouicha and Vieider (2017),
whereby risk aversion decreases with income within countries, but increases with national
income between countries.
The experimental evidence here presented needs to be reconciled with the observed
real world behavior of farmers in poor countries. There is indeed considerable evi-
dence that farmers employ risk averse strategies in their real decisions. For instance,
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) famously described the use of risk averse income
smoothing strategies by poor farmers in India, and Jayachandran (2006) showed that
the poorest often sell their labour at a considerable risk premium rather than employing
it more fruitfully on their own farms. This type of evidence, however, does not lend
itself to comparison with Western populations, which generally have much lower risk ex-
posure—over-insuring even modest risks is all too common in the West (Sydnor, 2010).
Indeed, many elements other than the small stake risk preferences measured in experi-
ments may play a role in such decisions (we will return to this point in the discussion).
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our subject pool, the measurement
tasks, and the general setup of the experiment. Section 3 introduces the theoretical setup
and discusses the econometric specifications used. Section 4 presents the results. Section
5 discusses the results and concludes the paper.
2 Experimental setup
We recruited 207 farmers in the Vietnamese villages Phu Hiep, Phu Loi and Phu Quoi
in An Giang province, close to the border with Cambodia alongside the Tien river. The
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villages were chosen at random amongst a number of locations where we could obtain
the backing of the local party authorities. No systematic selection effects are likely to be
caused by this—we will discuss this point more at length below. The households were
randomly chosen from a complete population list of the three villages. Using repeated
visits and trying to make appointments in case household heads were absent in the first
visit, we achieved a 100% participation rate of our target population. This means that
our sample is representative of the village reality of Southern Vietnam, although we
cannot claim representativeness outside of this specific subject pool.
The median household in our sample has an income of 9.9m Dong per capita per
year. This corresponds to $1.32 per capita per day for the median households in cur-
rent exchange rates at the time of the experiment, and to $2.89 in purchasing power
parity (PPP ; calculated using World Bank data for 2011). The corresponding means
are $2.26 (sd: 3.38) and $4.95 (sd: 7.39) respectively. About 24% of our subjects fall
below the official poverty line of the Vietnamese government.1 Income was measured
by asking farmers about different categories of income (e.g., income from farming, ani-
mals husbandry and aquaculture, from labour, leased land, remittances, etc.) and then
aggregating across those categories (the full questionnaire is reported in the supplemen-
tary materials). Since most farmers in the region produce for the market, and since we
ran our experiments not too long after the main harvest season, the information was
relatively recent and hence easy to remember. Given the importance of income for our
study, we also compare our sample to the corresponding figures for comparable popula-
tion groups, as obtained from the Vietnamese statistical office (www.gso.gov.vn). The
income per capita of our farmers is indeed not significantly different from the one of the
rural population in Vietnam at large (t(198) = −1.01, p = 0.312, two-sided t-test).
We elicit certainty equivalents (CEs) to measure risk preferences. CEs provide a rich
amount of information, are easy to explain to subjects, and the sure amounts of money
to be used in the elicitation are naturally limited between the lower and upper amount
of the prospect. They are also flexible enough to allow for the detection of risk-seeking
as well as risk neutral and risk averse behavior. This makes them well-suited to estimate
structural models of decision making (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and
1The poverty line applied here is based on “Decision of the Prime Minister 9/2011/QD-TTG: Pro-
mulgating standards of poor households, poor households to apply for stage from 2011 to 2015”, in which
the poverty line for rural areas is 400,000 Dong per capita per month and for urban areas it is 500,000
Dong per capita per month.
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Table 1: decision tasks, amounts in 1000s of Dong
gains losses mixed
(1/2: 40; 0) (1/2: -40; 0) 0∼(1/2: 160; z*)
(1/2: 80; 0) (1/2: -80; 0)
(1/2: 160; 0) (1/2: -160; 0)
(1/2: 240; 0) (1/2: -160; -40)
(1/2: 240; 80) (1/2: -160; -80)
(1/2: 240; 160)
(1/8: 160; 0) (1/8: -160; 0)
(1/8: 160; 40) 1/8: -160; -40)
(2/8: 160; 0) (2/8: 160; 0
(3/8: 160; 0) (3/8: -160; 0)
(5/8: 160; 0) (5/8: -160; 0)
(6/8: 160; 0) (6/8: -160; 0)
(7/8: 160; 0) (7/8: -160; 0)
(7/8: 160; 40) (7/8: -160; -40)
Epper, 2010; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Overall, we elicited 44 CEs per subject.
The tasks used for the elicitation procedure were chosen so as to allow for the estimation
of multi-parameter models, and were tested in extensive pilots with students before being
deployed in the field. Table 1 provides an overview of the decision tasks, and figure 1
shows an example of a choice list. Prospects are described in the format (p : x; y), where
p is the probability of obtaining x, and y obtains with a complementary probability
1 − p, |x| > |y|. Outcomes are shown in thousands of Dongs (8,000 Dong = 1 Euro in
PPP). Losses were deducted from an endowment equivalent to the highest potential loss,
given conditional on playing the loss part of the experiment. The highest loss is smaller
than the largest gain. This was necessary to limit financial exposure, since all subjects
who were randomly selected to play the loss part were given an endowment equal to the
highest possible loss. In addition to the prospects over gains and losses, we used one
mixed prospect, which is necessary to obtain a measure of loss aversion. In this case, we
obtained the value z* which satisfies the indifference 0 ∼ (1/2 : 160;−z), where z varied
in a choice list from 160,000 to 16,000 Dong.2
Gains were administered before losses, which took part from an endowment (see
Etchart-Vincent and L’Haridon, 2011, for evidence that it does not matter whether
losses take place from an endowment or are real). We also had prospects with unknown
or vague probabilities that will not be analyzed here, and which were always presented
2The choice tasks (though not the instructions, this experiment being run in individual interviews)
and payoffs were the same as the ones used by Vieider et al., 2015 in experiments with students across 30
countries. For an overview of the tasks, see the instructions available for download in various languages
at www.ferdinandvieider.com/instructions.html.
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Figure 1: Example of choice list to elicit a CE (in PPP Euros)
in block after the risky prospects. The prospects were presented to subjects in a fixed
order, whereby first 50-50 prospects were presented in order of ascending expected value,
and then the remaining prospects were presented in order of increasing probability. The
fixed order was kept so as to make the task less cognitively demanding for subjects,
since in the fixed ordering only one element would change from one decision task to the
next, which could be easily pointed out by the enumerator. To test whether such a fixed
ordering of tasks might influence decisions, we ran a large-scale pilot at Ho-Chi-Minh-
City University involving 330 subjects. The pilot revealed no differences between the
fixed ordering used here and a random ordering (results available upon request).
CEs were elicited in individual interviews by a team of 18 enumerators. The enumer-
ators were extensively trained before going to the field, and had acquired experience by
running the same experiment with students. They were furthermore supervised in the
field by one of the authors. The actual experiment was preceded by a careful explanation
of the decision tasks involved. The subjects were told that they would face choices be-
tween amounts of money that could be obtained for sure and risky allocations, in which
different amounts would obtain with some probabilities indicated next to them. They
then learned that the interview would consist in a number of such tasks that would differ
in the amounts they offered as well as the likelihood with which these amounts obtained.
At the end, one of the tasks would be extracted at random, and one of the lines in which
they had indicated a choice between a sure amount and the prospect would be played
for real money (the standard procedure in this sort of task: Abdellaoui et al., 2011;
Baltussen, Post, van den Assem and Wakker, 2012; Bruhin et al., 2010; Choi, Fisman,
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Gale and Kariv, 2007). Losses were only introduced once all the gain prospects had been
played. Small breaks were taken between the different parts of the elicitation procedure.
Once a subject had understood the general structure, he was presented an example
of a decision task for risky gains. The enumerator then explained why for a safe amount
equal to the lower amount in the prospect, he would likely prefer to take the prospect.
Equivalently, once the sure amount reached the highest amount to be won in the prospect,
the subject would be explained that he would most likely prefer the sure amount. This
would lead naturally to a point at which a subject should switch from the prospect
to the sure amount. At which amount this would happen would be purely up to the
subjects’s preference. Most subjects understood this very quickly. If subjects wanted to
switch multiple times, enumerators were instructed to simply record such choices. This,
however, never happened.
Since all farmers were literate, they were shown the lottery depiction and the amounts
involved on the interview sheet. Every time a major change occurred in the decision tasks
(e.g. a change in probabilities or outcomes, or from gains to losses), the enumerator
pointed out the change and gave additional explanations of what this would involve.
In the course of the explanation, farmers were also shown bags containing numbered
ping pong balls that would be used for the random extraction, and were encouraged to
examine their contents. This served to make the decision problems more tangible and
concrete.
The prospects concerned payoffs between 0 and 320,000 Dong (in the mixed prospect,
including the endowment), which were added to a fixed participation payment of 8,000
Dong (these payoffs are the PPP-equivalent of the payoffs used by Vieider et al., 2015;
see Vieider, 2012, for evidence that small stake variations potentially caused by local
differences in PPP do not impact estimated risk preferences). These are substantial
sums, with the expected payoff from participation corresponding to about 6 days’ per
capita income of the median household, and the highest prize to over 10 days. This
indicates a general tendency by which PPP conversions used for developing countries
underestimate the amounts used if one were to employ income instead of prices as a
gauge. Notice how, given the well-established finding of risk aversion increasing in stakes
(Binswanger, 1980; Fehr-Duda, Bruhin, Epper and Schubert, 2010; Holt and Laury, 2002;
Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Santos-Pinto, Astebro and Mata, 2009), this tends to
bias our findings against risk tolerance. Notice also that the payoffs we offer are at
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least as high as most of the payoffs offered in similar studies in developing countries (for
instance, Attanasio, Barr, Cardenas, Genicot and Meghir, 2012, have average payoffs
of about $2, corresponding to about 1 day’s pay; Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009 have an
average payoff of about 3 days of pay).
The overall quality of our data is reasonably good, although there are also significant
levels of noise. About 25% of our subjects violated first order stochastic dominance at
least once for gains, and about 31% for losses.3 This is only slightly higher than violation
rates observed with student samples from the West. Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, L’Haridon
and Van Dolder (2013) found about 20% of subjects to violate stochastic dominance in
a laboratory experiment with students in the Netherlands using individual interviews.
Overall violations relative to total number of CEs in our farmer data amount to only
about 3.0% for gains, and to 4.3% for losses.
3 Theory and Econometrics
3.1 Theoretical setup
The results presented in this paper are stable to using most major theories, including
expected utility theory (EUT ) and prospect theory (PT ). The main modelling approach
in the paper is motivated by obtaining the highest possible descriptive accuracy, con-
ditional on keeping the analysis tractable from an empirical point of view. We will
adopt a reference-dependent modelling approach throughout. Such an approach is an
integral part of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). It was first proposed
for expected utility by Markowitz (1952), in an attempt to accommodate the observa-
tion of lottery and insurance purchase by the same person, and has by now been widely
adopted into expected utility models in both theory and empirical analysis (Diecidue and
van de Ven, 2008; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2007; Sugden, 2003; von Gaudecker, van Soest
and Wengström, 2011).4 The elicitation tasks are designed in such a way as to fix the
reference point to zero—see L’Haridon and Vieider (2018) for a more detailed discussion.
3Violations of first order stochastic dominance are not transparent in our experiment. They could
occur for instance, if a CE for a given prospect (p: x; y) is larger than a CE for another prospect
(p+  : x; y) or a prospect (p : x+ ; y), where  > 0, and x > y.
4We refer to these models as models of ‘expected utility’ insmuch as they still transform outcomes
into utilities and then take the expectation of these utilities. The main difference with (original) EUT is
that reference-dependent models define utility over changes in wealth, while the original model defined
utility over total wealth.
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We will start by representing our preferences through a PT model. We describe
decisions for binary prospects. For outcomes that fall purely into one domain, i.e. x >
y ≥ 0 or 0 ≥ y > x, we can represent the utility of a prospect ξi, U(ξi), as follows:
U(ξi) = w
j(pi)v(xi) + [1− wj(pi)]v(yi) (1)
whereby the probability weighting function w(p) is a strictly increasing function that
maps probabilities into decision weights, and which satisfies w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1;
the superscript j indicates the decision domain and can take the values + for gains and
− for losses; and v(.) represents a utility or value function which indicates preferences
over outcomes, with a fixed point such that v(0) = 0, and v(x) = −v(−x) if x < 0.
Contrary to expected utility models, utility curvature in the full PT model cannot be
automatically equated with risk preferences, since the latter are determined jointly by
the utility function and the weighting function (Schmidt and Zank, 2008). For mixed
prospects, where x > 0 > y, the utility of the prospect can be represented as:
U(ξi) = w
+(pi)v(xi) + w
−(1− pi)v(yi) (2)
In our experimental tasks, we elicit certainty equivalents, such that by definition ce ∼
(x, p; y), where ∼ indicates indifference. We can represent the certainty equivalents
estimated according to the model just presented as follows:
cˆei = v
−1 [wj(pi)v(xi) + (1− wj(pi))v(yi)] (3)
In order to specify the model set out above, we need to determine the functional forms
to be used. We start by assuming utility to be piecewise linear:
v(x) =

x if x > 0
−λ(−x) if x ≤ 0
(4)
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where the parameter λ indicates loss aversion, generally represented as a kink in the
utility function at the origin (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and Paraschiv, 2007; Köbberling
and Wakker, 2005).
Simplifying our model by assuming utility to be linear has several advantages in our
setup, which we belief more than outweigh potential drawbacks. Yaari (1987) powerfully
made the point that representing risk preferences through subjective probability trans-
formations is just as legitimate as representing them through outcome transformations,
and may be more psychologically accurate for small stakes. Our model is then the natural
extension of Yaari’s Dual Theory to reference-dependent models (see Schmidt and Zank,
2007, for an axiomatization of this model). Most importantly, this assumption allows us
to directly compare subject pools in terms of their risk preferences. This is much more
difficult using a full prospect theory model, given issues of collinearity between utility
and weighting functions, which may both reflect risk preferences under prospect theory
(Zeisberger, Vrecko and Langer, 2012). The obvious cost of our simplification is that
we largely ignore any variation taking place over different stake levels. This variation is,
however, modest in our data, and most interesting patterns with our stake levels typi-
cally emerge over the probability dimension (Fehr-Duda and Epper, 2012; Prelec, 1998).
Most importantly, none of the results presented below depend on the linear probability
assumption (see appendix A for a stability analysis using the full PT model).
For probability weighting, we adopt the 2-parameter weighting function proposed by
Prelec (1998). (Other functional forms from the two-parameter family deliver similar
results. One-parameter forms are, on the other hand, not well suited to describe our
data, for reasons that will become apparent below):
w(p) = exp(−βj(−ln(p))αj ) (5)
For β = 1, this function conveniently simplifies to the 1-parameter function proposed
by Prelec, which has a fixed point at 1/e ' 0.368, and which has been developed to fit
typical aggregate data from the West.5 In terms of interpretation, β is a parameter that
governs mostly the elevation of the weighting function, with higher values indicating a
5The one-parameter formulation was for instance adopted by Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010)
to investigate risk preferences in Vietnam. We will discuss their results in more detail below.
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lower function. Since this indicates the weight assigned to the best outcome for gains,
and the weight assigned to the worst outcome for losses, a higher value of β indicates
increased probabilistic pessimism for gains, and increased probabilistic optimism for
losses. Since we assume utility to be linear, we can directly interpret this parameter to
indicate risk aversion for gains, and risk seeking for losses on average over the probability
spectrum. For α = 1, the parameter indeed represents standard risk aversion, with β ≥ 1
indicating risk aversion and β ≤ 1 risk seeking. The parameter α governs the slope of the
probability weighting function, with α = 1 indicating linearity of the weighting function
(the EUT case), and α < 1 representing the typical case of probabilistic insentivity.
3.2 Stochastic modeling and econometric specification
The model considered so far is fully deterministic, assuming that subjects know their
preferences perfectly well and execute them without making mistakes. It also assumes
that we can capture such preferences perfectly in our model. Both assumptions seem
untenable, especially in a development setting such as ours. We thus abandon this
restrictive assumption and introduce an explicit stochastic structure. Given our setup,
the certainty equivalent of a given prospect i we observe, cei will thus be equal to the
certainty equivalent for the same prospect calculated from our model, cˆei, plus some error
term, or cei = cˆei + i. We assume this error to be normally distributed, i ∼ (0, σ2i ),
which allows for the errors to be serially correlated (see Train, 2009). We can now express
the probability density function ψ(.) for a given subject n as follows
ψ(θn, σnij , ξi) = φ
(
cˆeniθ − ceni
σnij
)
(6)
where φ is the standard normal density function, and θ = {λ, αj , βj , } indicates the vector
of parameters to be estimated. The subscript n to the parameter vector θ indicates that
we will let the parameters depend linearly on the observable characteristics of decision
makers, such that θˆ = θˆk + βX, where θˆk is a vector of constants and X represents
a matrix of observable characteristics of the decision maker.6 Finally, σ indicates a
6We always carry out the regression within the overall maximim likelihood model. A possible al-
ternative is to estimate the parameters at the individual level, and then to separately regress these
parameters on the characteristics of the decision makers. We deem such an approach less suitable for
our purposes, both because estimations at the individual level are based on relatively few data points
and may result in outliers, and because it is not clear how to treat the standard errors in separate
regressions of parameters that result from one and the same estimation procedure.
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so-called Fechner error (Hey and Orme, 1994). The subscripts emphasize that we are
allowing for three different types of heteroscedasticity, whereby n indicates as usual the
observable characteristics of the decision maker, j indicates the decision domain (gains
vs. losses), and i indicates that we allow the error term to depend on the specific
prospect, or rather, on the difference between the high and low outcome in the prospect,
such that σi = σ|xi − yi| (see Bruhin et al., 2010). For mixed prospects, we adopt the
error term for losses, since only losses vary in the mixed choice list.
These parameters can now be estimated by maximum likelihood procedures. To
obtain the overall likelihood function, we need to take the product of the density functions
above across prospects and decision makers:
L(θ) =
N∏
n=1
∏
i
ψ(θn, σnij , ξi) (7)
where θ is the vector of parameters to be estimated such as to maximize the likelihood
function. Taking logs, we obtain the following log-likelihood function:
LL(θ) =
N∑
n=1
∑
i
ln [ψ(θn, σni, ξi)] (8)
We estimate this log-likelihood function in Stata using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-
Shanno optimization algorithm. Errors are always clustered at the subject level.
4 Results
4.1 Risk preference comparison
Table 2 shows a regression comparing the parameter estimates for farmers to those of
American and Vietnamese students. The student data were obtained using the same
experimental tasks as the ones used with the farmers and stakes are the same in terms of
PPP. The American student data are borrowed from L’Haridon and Vieider (2018), who
amongst other things report parameter estimates for the same model for students across
30 countries, and are meant to relate our current data to the results of that paper.7
7The data for American students were obained using sessions instead of individual interviews. For
Vietnamese students, we obtained the data partially in interviews using identical procedures as for
farmers, partially in sessions. We pool the data since we did not find any differences between the two
methods (except for loss aversion, which is found to be lower in the interview condition; see Vieider,
2009, for a potential explanation). A regression showing this is reported in the supplementary materials.
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In this sense, American students are meant to proxy for Western populations more in
general—a point to which we will return shortly.
The regression controls for the sex of the respondent to address concerns that differ-
ences may be driven by gender effects that are often found for risk (Croson and Gneezy,
2009), but the differences found are stable to dropping the demographic controls. Adding
additional controls is difficult, as the control variables obtained for the student and farmer
subject pools are generally not comparable. An exception to this is age. However, given
that all our students are very young compared to the farmer sample, adding age results
in high degrees of collinearity with the student dummies. We find that women are less
sensitive to probabilistic change for both gains and losses, as well as less risk tolerant for
losses. This is in line with the results reported by L’Haridon and Vieider (2018), who
find a gender effect mostly on probabilistic sensitivity using a sample of almost 3000
students from 30 countries.
Table 2: Comparison between farmers and Vietnamese and US students
N=424, LL=-33,294 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
students US 0.309*** 0.220*** 0.353*** -0.144** 0.099 -0.141***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.060) (0.060) (0.144) (0.021)
students Vietnam 0.236*** -0.036 0.221*** -0.026 -0.128 -0.088***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.056) (0.065) (0.093) (0.020)
female -0.140*** 0.049 -0.105** -0.114** 0.131 0.027
(0.048) (0.044) (0.052) (0.055) (0.101) (0.022)
constant 0.492*** 0.821*** 0.535*** 1.069*** 1.664*** 0.300***
(0.031) (0.042) (0.032) (0.047) (0.068) (0.011)
We find both student groups to be significantly more sensitive to probabilistic change
than farmers, as indicated by the larger α parameter. This holds for both gains and
losses, and is consistent with the interpretation of the sensitivity parameter as a proxy
for rationality or numeracy (Tversky and Wakker, 1995; Wakker, 2010). Students also
show less noise in their decisions compared to the farmers. The farmers are slightly (but
not significantly) less risk tolerant than Vietnamese students for gains, as indicated by the
negative coefficient for the β+ parameter. The farmers are, however, significantly more
risk tolerant than the American students for both gains and losses. Indeed, American
students exhibit decision patterns as they have typically been estimated in the West (see
again L’Haridon and Vieider, 2018), with a β+ parameter slightly larger than one.8 For
8For the prospect theory formulation shown in the appendix, β+ = 1 cannot be rejected for American
students, so that the function reduces to its one-parameter formulation. This estimate is thus at the
lower end in terms of risk aversion of the range of estimates obtained in Western countries—see Booij,
Praag and van de Kuilen (2010) for an overview.
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loss aversion we find again that our farmers are intermediate between the two student
populations, although none of the differences are significant.
Figure 2: Risk-preference functions for gains, farmeres versus students
Figure 4 shows the three risk preference functions for gains together with the non-
parametric data points (for losses see supplementary materials).9 The estimated func-
tions can be seen to trace the nonparametric data closely. The risk-preference function
for farmers is more elevated than the one of the American students up to and including
p = 5/8, and becomes very similar and somewhat lower for the two highest probability
levels respectively. Compared to Vietnamese students, the risk preference functions are
very similar up to at least p = 3/8, after which the two functions start to diverge, as
reflected in the farmers’ lower probabilistic sensitivity.
The comparison results may appear surprising, given a large number of studies show-
ing risk aversion as the prevalent pattern in decisions under risk (we will discuss this
point further below). To investigate the stability of these findings—and to be able
to discuss average risk preferences over all choices with one simple measure—we now
take the risk premium, given by EV − CE, averaged over all gain prospects (in PPP
Euros; PPP US Dollars obtain by multiplication with 1.2).10 We here concentrate on
9The non-parametric data are made comparable to the parametric estimates by normlisation of the
certainty equivalent, CE−y
x−y , which are then plotted against the probability of winning the prize x.
10Notice how using a normaised risk premium, EV−CE
EV
attributes more weight to small-probability
prospects relative to large-probability prospects, thus distorting the picture. Nonetheless, all our results
are even stronger under this definition, as the largest differences are observed for small to moderate
probability prospects.
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gains—an equivalent analysis for losses is shown in the supplementary materials. Farmers
have a significantly lower risk premium than American students (z = −2.07, p = 0.039,
two-sided Mann Whitney test), and a (non-significantly) larger risk premium than Viet-
namese students (z = 1.54, p = 0.123). While American students are significantly risk
averse (z = 4.67, p < 0.001; two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test), the farmers are on
average risk neutral (z=0.23, p=0.815), and Vietnamese students are on average risk
seeking (z = −2.38, p = 0.017). These findings are in no way unique to American stu-
dents, whom we use as a typical exponent of Western subject pools. L’Haridon and
Vieider (2018) indeed show a strong positive correlation between risk aversion and GDP
per capita using students subject pools from 30 different countries over a wide range of
income levels, and Vieider, Beyene, Bluffstone, Dissanayake, Gebreegziabher, Martins-
son and Mekonnen (2018) report results for a general population sample from Ethiopia
that is consistent with the evidence obtained for students.
4.2 Risk preferences and economic well-being
So far we have only considered aggregate preferences. The next step will be to look
into individual characteristics and their correlation with risk preferences. In particular,
we are interested in income, as well as measures of wealth. Table 3 shows the results
of a regression of risk preferences on income per capita, education, and the age of the
respondent (z-values are used for age, education, and income; using discrete categories
for education does not change our results). Our subject pool is reduced to 197 subjects,
since for the remaining subjects one of the observable characteristics is not reported.
Table 3: Effects of income on risk preferences
N=197, LL = −16, 382 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
alpha beta gamma delta lambda noise
income -0.007 -0.074** -0.007 0.078* -0.065** -0.009
(0.036) (0.030) (0.031) (0.046) (0.028) (0.006)
education 0.053 0.030 0.060 0.028 0.174** -0.016**
(0.037) (0.040) (0.043) (0.129) (0.088) (0.007)
age -0.075** 0.025 -0.062** -0.027 0.094 0.017
(0.032) (0.051) (0.031) (0.053) (0.089) (0.011)
female 0.141 0.223 0.120 -0.385*** 0.832 -0.078***
(0.169) (0.364) (0.101) (0.104) (0.663) (0.026)
constant 0.489*** 0.820*** 0.529*** 1.095*** 1.676*** 0.312***
(0.032) (0.043) (0.031) (0.049) (0.073) (0.012)
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
We start by looking at the elevation of the risk preference function. For both gains and
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losses, we find risk tolerance to increase in income, as indicated by the negative coefficient
for β+ and the positive coefficient for β− (since for losses we transform probabilities
attached to the worst outcome, following the going convention; see Wakker, 2010). Loss
aversion is also found to decrease in income. Probabilistic sensitivity for both gains
and losses decreases with age. Given that probabilistic sensitivity is often taken to be
an indicator of rationality or cognitive ability, this corresponds well to what we would
expect. Also, the result corresponds closely to the results reported by L’Haridon and
Vieider (2018), who find sensitivity to decrease in age and increase in grade point average.
It is also in general agreement with findings by Choi, Kariv, Müller and Silverman (2014),
who found violations of rationality principles to increase with age and decrease with
education and income (the latter effect is not significant in our data). Loss aversion is
also found to increase in education. This is contrary to the findings of Gächter, Johnson
and Herrmann (2010), but in agreement with the findings by von Gaudecker et al. (2011).
An important issue is whether our findings are indeed driven by income, and not
by wealth. To capture wealth levels we use the first two components from a principal
component analysis into which all variables capturing wealth in our data set are entered,
such as size and type of house, access to running water, sanitation facilities, motorcycles
owned, ownership of TV or fridge, etc. (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). Table 4 reproduces
the results from table 3 controlling for these wealth indicators.11 The wealth controls
do not show any significant effects. This goes against the traditional assumption of risk
aversion decreasing in wealth. The effect of income, however, only results reinforced from
the introduction of wealth controls.
We thus find clear evidence of a negative correlation between risk aversion and in-
come in our data. Such a negative correlation has frequently been reported in Western
population samples (e.g., Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp and Wagner, 2011;
Donkers, Melenberg and Van Soest, 2001; Hopland, Matsen and Strøm, 2016), although
sometimes it has been found only for a subset of the risk preference measures used (for
instance, von Gaudecker et al., 2011, and Booij et al., 2010 both only found the effect for
loss aversion in representative Dutch samples, but not for utility curvature over gains),
and at least one study found an effect going in the opposite direction (Harrison, Lau and
Rutström, 2007). A similar negative relationship with income or income proxies and risk
11Wealth is positively correlated with income, as one might expect. However, the correlations of our
income measure with the first principal component of wealth is relatively modest at r=0.31.
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Table 4: Income regression with wealth controls
N=185, LL = −15383 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
income -0.004 -0.082** -0.009 0.103* -0.050** -0.004
(0.048) (0.034) (0.033) (0.056) (0.025) (0.009)
education 0.065 0.023 0.074* 0.080 0.170* -0.014**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.119) (0.088) (0.006)
age -0.066* 0.016 -0.060* -0.008 0.098 0.018
(0.039) (0.065) (0.034) (0.057) (0.091) (0.011)
female 0.099 0.203 0.107 -0.351*** 0.544 -0.071***
(0.188) (0.361) (0.088) (0.120) (0.422) (0.025)
pc1 wealth 0.006 0.010 -0.007 -0.034 -0.034 -0.011***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.054) (0.004)
pc2 wealth 0.015 0.024 -0.013 0.025 -0.108* -0.007
(0.027) (0.041) (0.043) (0.025) (0.062) (0.005)
constant 0.487*** 0.823*** 0.539*** 1.103*** 1.702*** 0.316***
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
aversion has also been found repeatedly in developing countries (Liebenehm and Waibel,
2014; Vieider et al., 2018; Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009). Other studies, especially in devel-
oping countries, have not found any correlation between risk preferences and measures
of well-being (Binswanger, 1980; Cardenas and Carpenter, 2013).
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The results presented in this paper break radically with some assumptions on risk pref-
erences of rural populations in developing countries. Far from finding high levels of risk
aversion amongst poor farmers, we find farmers in Vietnam to be quite risk tolerant in
comparison to typical Western populations. Taken together with international compar-
isons based on student samples (Rieger et al., 2014; Vieider et al., 2015), and with results
from other general population samples of poor countries (Vieider et al., 2018), the results
here presented provide increasingly solid evidence of a systematic negative relationship
between risk tolerance and GDP per capita between countries. We have furthermore
shown a clear increase in risk tolerance with income within the farmer sample itself,
while risk preferences were found to be uncorrelated with wealth. This may indeed show
one of the reasons why past studies especially in developing countries have not always
found a correlation with measures of well-being.
Given how strong the relationship with income is, it seems unlikely that other factors
would constitute a better explanation for these aggregate risk preferences. In particular,
we do not think that our data can be explained in any way by noise or systematic error.
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While answering randomly on our choice lists would produce risk neutrality on average,
the choice patterns we find are clearly not random. Indeed, purely random choice would
result in much higher frequency of violations of first order stochastic dominance than
the ones we found, and would be picked up mostly by the error term.
For the development literature, the high level of risk tolerance we find at the aggregate
level poses the issue of what may hold back technology adoption on the farm. To the
extent that preferences cannot be blamed for this, we may look at other factors that
hinder adoption. Feder (1980) observed how “risk and risk-aversion have been used to
explain differences in input use and the relative rate of adoption of modern technologies
by farmers of different sizes. But different patterns of behaviour are observed in different
regions, and thus the impact of risk and risk-aversion needs to be examined in relation to
other factors and constraints [...]” (p. 263). This conclusion is reinforced in some of the
recent literature. Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto and Udry (2012) present results suggesting
that it is the sheer amount of risk exposure that makes investments unprofitable in some
cases. Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) present evidence that risk taking in production
goes up once farmers are sheltered from the worst risks through insurance. This suggests
that risk averse coping behavior may be driven by external constraints, rather than or
in addition to individual preferences (Feder, Just and Zilberman, 1985). This obviously
does not preclude an effect of individual risk attitudes on the relative likelihood of a
farmer to adopt new technology. This issue is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
The high levels of risk tolerance we find seem to contrast with a large part of the
existing development literature. This may at least in part be due to the popularity
enjoyed amongst development economists by choice list that are systematically distorted
in the direction of risk aversion. For instance the task developed by Binswanger (1980)
remains hugely popular in development economics because of its simplicity (Attanasio
et al., 2012; Bauer, Chytilová and Morduch, 2012; Giné, Townsend and Vickery, 2008;
Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009). While it may be perfectly adequate to detect within-sample
differences, it is capped at risk neutrality, thus making it impossible to register risk
seeking behavior. In the presence of noise registering in terms of random choices, it will
thus result in a drastic overestimation of risk aversion (Vieider, 2018).
Our results are also quite different from the ones obtained by Tanaka et al. (2010)
in the same area of southern Vietnam. Once again, this may be due to the asymmetric
choice lists employed by the latter. The case of risk neutrality, which in their model
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would obtain for linear utility in combination with linear probability weights, obtains
in their model when subjects switch around the middle of list 1, but at the very first
question in list 2 (list 3 is used only to determine loss aversion). The relation of risk
aversion to each step in the choice list is furthermore highly nonlinear, so that each
step beyond the point of risk neutrality results in increasingly large steps in terms of
estimated risk aversion. Just like the Binswanger task, the elicitation tasks are very
unlikely to result in the detection of risk seeking behavior in the presence of noise,
with noise counted systematically towards risk aversion. Clearly, there are also other
differences in both elicitation and estimation that might drive the differences in our
findings. More direct comparative evidence on risk elicitation tasks is needed in order
to disentangle the influence of different factors.
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A Subject pool comparison under PT
Table 5 shows the subject pool comparison using the full PT model, using a domain-
specific power utility function. Utility for gains can be seen to be slightly convex for
our farmers, an effect that is marginally significant (χ2(1) = 3.63, p = 0.057). Utility is
more convex for Vietnamese students and linear for American students, although nei-
ther of the two differences is statistically significant. To examine the results in terms of
risk preferences, however, we must consider them jointly with the results on probability
weighting. Both student populations are significantly more probabilistically sensitive
than the farmers. American students are also marginally significantly more pessimistic
than the farmers, as indicated by the higher value of β+. However, the difference between
farmers and American students on utility curvature and the elevation of the probabil-
ity weighting function jointly is highly significant (χ2(1) = 15.59, p < 0.001). While
Vietnamese farmers show significant probabilistic optimism (χ2(1) = 4.13, p = 0.042,
rejecting β+ = 1), for American students we cannot reject the hypothesis that β+ = 1
(χ2(1) = 0.27, p = 0.605), which corresponds to typical findings from the West. The
results for losses are similar and will not be discussed further.
Table 5: Subject pool comparison, PT
N=425, LL = −33, 261 µ ν λ α+ β+ α− β− σ
students US -0.072 -0.073 -0.449 0.317*** 0.157* 0.348*** -0.195* -0.140***
(0.093) (0.098) (0.348) (0.050) (0.092) (0.058) (0.116) (0.018)
students Vietnam 0.072 0.247* -0.577* 0.227*** 0.017 0.212*** 0.153 -0.089***
(0.096) (0.132) (0.335) (0.052) (0.093) (0.055) (0.158) (0.020)
female -0.153 0.050 -0.451 -0.129*** -0.074 -0.103** -0.085 0.029
(0.098) (0.127) (0.293) (0.047) (0.091) (0.051) (0.127) (0.021)
constant 1.093*** 1.228*** 1.687*** 0.490*** 0.884*** 0.532*** 1.266*** 0.301***
(0.049) (0.061) (0.249) (0.031) (0.057) (0.031) (0.083) (0.011)
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
A Graphs for losses
A.1 Nonparametric data fit
Figure 3 shows the fit of the estimated functional form to data for losses. Similar as
for gains in the main text, the risk-preference function provides a close fit to the non-
parametric data. The eception to this rule are once again the observations with p = 0.5
and varying outcomes that were explicitly inserted to separate utility curvature from
probability weighting.
Figure 3: Fit of risk preference function to non-parametric data, losses
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A.2 Subject pool comparison
The comparison of our farmers to the two students subject pools for losses is shown in
figure 4. Similar to the results obtained with losses in the main text, and consistently
with the comparison across the 30 countries shown in the appendix, Vietnamese students
are more risk tolerant than American students, which is ow shown by a less elevated risk-
preference function. Farmer, on the other hand, are even more risk tolerant.
Figure 4: Risk-preference functions for losse4s, farmeres versus students
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B Regression results
B.1 Non-parametric income regression
Table 6 shows a regression of the mean risk premium per domain on income and the
demographic variables as in the main text. Regression I reproduces the simple regression
including income per capita, education, and age, while regression II adds the first two
principal components of wealth. Income shows a consistent negative effect, indicating
that risk aversion decreases in income for both gains and losses. This effect is marginally
significant in all regressions. There are no other significant effects.
Table 6: OLS regression of mean risk premium on income and demographics
gains losses
I II I II
income -0.519* -0.558* -0.422* -0.479*
(0.306) (0.335) (0.253) (0.279)
education -0.008 -0.050 -0.187 -0.237
(0.322) (0.346) (0.265) (0.288)
age 0.271 0.278 0.021 0.010
(0.321) (0.349) (0.265) (0.290)
pc1 0.066 0.156
(0.209) (0.174)
pc2 0.106 0.025
(0.256) (0.213)
Subjects 197 197 197 197
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B.2 Interviews versus sessions with Vietnamese students
The data for farmers were obtained in individual interviews, whereas most of the compar-
ison results with students discussed in the text were obtained in experimental sessions.
To test whether this makes a difference, we compare 47 students in Vietnam who were
interviewed using the same procedures as for farmers to 84 students who participated in
regular experimental sessions.
Table 7: Comparison between interviews and sessions (Vietnamese students)
N=131, LL = −9, 824 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
interview 0.111 -0.090 -0.054 0.089 -0.360*** 0.053**
(0.071) (0.066) (0.083) (0.084) (0.095) (0.027)
female -0.089 0.021 -0.167** -0.072 0.024 -0.009
(0.065) (0.057) (0.078) (0.074) (0.092) (0.020)
age 0.016 -0.008 -0.014 -0.021 0.026 -0.004
(0.029) (0.020) (0.029) (0.023) (0.033) (0.008)
constant 0.339 0.988** 1.095* 1.416*** 1.186* 0.274*
(0.593) (0.399) (0.611) (0.461) (0.656) (0.165)
The results are reported in table 7. There is no effect of the interview dummy on
the sensitivity or risk preference parameters for either gains or losses. The one effect
we do find is on loss aversion. This is indeed consistent with previous findings in the
literature, according to which loss aversion is reduced if subjects are asked to justify
their decisions (Pahlke, Strasser and Vieider, 2012; Vieider, 2009). Although there was
no explicit justification requirement here, subjects in interview sessions may have felt
increased pressure and observability nevertheless. Somewhat surprisingly, noise is also
significantly higher in the interviews than in the sessions. A more thorough analysis of
the data will be provided elsewhere.
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C Questionnaire
30
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Interviewer Information: 
Are there people at home?   Yes _____  Proceed 
with the survey 
1st Visit    No  _____   
 
 
Are there people at home?   Yes _____  Proceed 
with the survey 
2nd Visit    No  _____   
 
Good morning (afternoon, night). My name is____________  I am conducting a 
survey regarding flooding and we are interested in know your opinion about this topic. In the 
survey you will have the opportunity to make some money by participating in a game. We 
would like to interview the person in the household who makes decision related to farming 
activities. This survey is totally confidential. Is it you? Or Could I talk to him/her? 
 
 
Yes _____  Thank you very much. 
No  _____  Reason:  
  [01] _____ Is not at home*  
  [02]_____  Cannot answer in this moment* 
                                            [03] _____Do not want to respond  
                       [04]_____ Other ______________________  
 
* Can I come back in other day/moment for apply it? 
 
 Yes _____   Day: _____________ 
 Time __________ 
 No  _____   Finish the survey 
 
If respondent does not show up in the second visit, the household is classified as non-
respondent. Enumerator picks a neighbor as a replacement.  
 
 
  
 
  
Date:_________________________________ ID:    _______________ 
Interviewer: _________________________________   
Name of household head:______________________ 
Location of the house: ___________________________   
 (Street/Sector/Commune) 
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Background information 
1-9 [ENUMERATOR:  Please ask these questions in below table for all household 
members.]  
 
List 1. 
Yearofbi
rth 
2. 
Marital 
status 
3. 
What class of 
school did 
you complete 
or what 
degrees have 
you received? 
4. 
Main 
occupati
on 
5. 
Gender 
(1=Male; 
0=Female
) 
6. For the last 
12 months, 
how many 
months has 
[…] been 
staying with 
the household  
7. Why did 
[…] leave 
this 
household? 
8. Which 
province 
does […] 
work in? 
9. 
What 
does 
[…] 
work? 
 
1          
2          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
10. What is your religion? 
1=  AncestorWorship 
2 = Buddhist 
3 = Catholic 
4 = Protestant 
5 = No Religion 
6=  Other, specify 
 
11. And your race? 
1=Kinh          2=Khmer     3=Thai        4=Han (China)      5=Islam    6= Other (Specify) 
 
Marital 
status 
Educationlevel Reasons for leaving Occupation list 
 
1= Single 
2= 
Married 
3= 
divorced 
4= widow 
1=no school 
2= Elementary school 
(first grade to fifth or 
sixth grade) 
3= Middle School 
(sixth or seventh 
grade to ninth grade 
4= High School (tenth 
grade to twelfth 
grade) 
5= vocational school 
6= college/university 
7=post graduate 
 
1=  For work 
2 = Married 
3 = Household split 
4 = For study 
5 = Moved with 
Family 
6=  Other (specify) 
  
 
1= Farmer/gardener 
2= Housewife 
3= work at local NGOs 
4= work at local government 
offices 
5= Unskilled manual 
worker/Contracted laborer 
6= Skilled manual worker 
7= Food seller on the street 
8= Street seller 
9= Teacher 
10=under labor age  
11=Driver  
12=Soldier 
 
13= Retired 
14= Owner of 
business  
15= Sewage Worker 
16= Small business 
17 = Fisherman  
18 = Service worker 
(eg. hotels, 
restaurants) 
19 = Unemployed 
95 = Other 
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12. How would you say your health is in general? (circleone option) 
Very good   1 
Good    2 
Neither good nor poor  3 
Poor    4 
Very poor   5 
 
13. How tall are you?__________________cm 
 
 
13.1 Are you member of Communist party?      1= yes           0= no 
(if yes, go to question 13.2: if no, go to question 14) 
13.2  For how many years have you been the member of the party?  __________ (year) 
13.3 How many other household members are member of Communist party? 1= yes 
_____________people 
Economic Status 
14. How much is your family average monthly income? 
Income source Amounts (Local currency) 
Salary  
Farming (cultivating, gardening)  
Animal husbandry (cow, aquaculture)  
Fishing  
Rentedlabor  
Leased land  
Remittance  
Other___________________  
 Note:   (98) no response   (99) don’t know/not sure 
15. Would you say that your annual income is stable or varies in the past 5 years? 
Very 
Stable 
         Very 
variable 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
16. How large proportion of the food consumed comes from your own land? ____% 
17. How much would it cost if you had purchased the food that comes from own land in the 
market?______________________________(in local currency) 
18. How much is your family’s monthly expenditure? 
Source Amount (Local currency) 
Food  
Education  
Health  
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Electricity and domestic water  
Small shopping  
Social events (for example wedding or funeral)   
Telephone  
Other __________________  
Total  
 
Householdwealth 
Housing 
19. What are the following parts of your house made of? 
Floor:  1 = Stone 
2 = Cement     
3 = Clay/Mud 
4 = Brick 
5 = Other:___________ 
Wall:   1 = Stone 
2 = Cement     
3 = Clay/Mud 
4 = Brick 
5 = Metal 
6 = Rattan 
7 = Other:___________ 
Roof:   1 = Thatch 
2 = Cement     
3 = Clay/Mud 
4 = Tile 
5 = Metal 
6 = Other:___________ 
20. How many rooms do you have in the house? ______ rooms 
 
21. What is the source of lighting in the house?  
 1 = Electricity 
 2 = Biogas 
 3 =Kerosene 
 4 = Other _____________ 
 
22. What is the main fuel used for cooking in the house? (Enumerator:  Readresponses)   
 1 = Electricity 
 2 = Gas 
 3 = Firewood 
 4 = Kerosene 
 5 = Charcoal 
 6 = Other 
 
23. What is your household's main source of water for cooking and drinking? 
1 = Private tap 
2 = Private well 
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3 = Public standpipe 
4 = Canal or river water 
5 = Other 
24. How far is the water source? ________minutes 
25. Do you have a private toilet in the house?          1= yes         0= no 
26. If “no” to question 25, where do you defecate? 1 = Open toilet         2= Community toilet 
27. If “yes” to question 25, where does the waste discharge to?  
1 = Sewer system 
2 = Septic tank 
3 = Pit 
4 = Do not know 
 
Consumer and productive durables 
28. How many of the following devices does your household have? 
A. Sewing machine  
B. Air-conditioning unit  
C. Refrigerator  
D. Television  
E. DVD/VCD/VHS player  
F.  Computer/Laptop  
G. Gaming console  
H. Mobile Phone  
I.  Motorcycle  
J.  Bicycle/electric bicycle  
K. Car  
L. Boat with engine  
M. Boat without engine  
 
Land holdings and agricultural investment 
29. How many ha of land does your household own? 
……………………….ha 
 
30 . How many of your ha has your household rentedin the previous season?  
 
……………………….ha 
 
31 . How many of your ha has your household leasedin the previous season?  
  
……………………….ha 
 
 
30. CALCULATE LAND AVAILABLE 29-30+31 
 
You have ….. ha available for farming IF ZERO SKIP TO Q31. 
If yes, please indicate for each category: 
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Land for rice production:____________ha 
Land for vegetable production:___________ha 
Otherland:___________ha 
31. Do you have a fish farm?  1 =yes            0 = no 
If a pond - please indicate size:_____________(m2) 
If a cage in river - please indicate size:_____________ (m2) 
32. Do you own any livestock? If yes, please indicate quantity for each type: 
pigs:__________ 
water buffalo:_______ 
cattle:__________ 
chicken:___________ 
other:____________ 
33. In general, what proportion of your agricultural and fishing production do you sell on the 
market? 
Agricultural: I sell_________% 
Fishing: I sell_________% 
 
Savings and Borrowing 
34. How does your household save money? 
1 = save at a banking account 
2 = save at home 
3 = save at a relatives/friend/neighbor’s home 
4 = save in Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA) 
5 = don’t save at all 
35. If yes, how much is your household’s total saving now? __________ 
36. If you are using ROSCA to save, how long have you been a member? (months) ____ 
(years)____ 
37. What does the arrangement you are sending your saving to ROSCA? 
1 = Daily     2 = Weekly         3 =Monthly             4 = Whenever money is available 
38. What are the purposes of the saving? 
1 = To build or buy a house 
2 = To buy consumer durables          
3 = To invest in income generating activities 
4 = To cater for a family emergency 
5 = Other _______________ 
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39. Has your houseshold borrow money since last 5 years?      1=yes      0=no 
If yes Credit 
source* 
Amount 
(local 
currency) 
Interest 
(per cent per 
month) 
 Main 
credittaker
** 
Expiration 
date 
Most important loan      
2nd most important loan      
3rd most important loan      
*: 1=bank; 2=relatives, neighbors and friends; 3=socio-organizations, 4=private lenders, 
5=development programs 
** 1= Householdhead 2= Spouse 3= Other 
 
40. How easy would it be to borrow 125 EUR?  (Enumerator: read responses) 
1 = Very easy 
2 = Somewhat easy 
3 = Somewhat difficult 
4 = Very difficult 
5 = Impossible 
6 = Don’t know/not sure 
 
41. If you want to borrow 125 EUR and cannot borrow it from a family member, where 
would you want to go to borrow it?  
 
1 = Neighbor/Friend 
2 = ROSCA 
3 = Official State-run Bank 
4 = Market money lender  
5 = Pawn shop (the place to take the motorbike or TV to get the money) 
6 = Other (please specify)   ______________________ 
7 = Don’t know/not sure 
 
42. How many lottery tickets do you buy during a normal month?___________________ 
 
Perception of weather and adaptation 
43. Do you know the [name of the station] gauging station?     1 = yes         0 = no 
44. What water level measured atthe [name] gauging station that starts to have negative 
effects on your economic activities and family welfare? ……………Meters 
45. What water level measured at the [name] gauging station that starts to have positive 
effects on your economic activities and family welfare? ……………Meters 
46. What water level measured at the [name] gauging station do you most prefer in terms of 
your family economic activities and welfare?……………Meters 
Recent flood years 
Please indicate on the scale below how good the flood was in recent years for you personally 
in terms of overall consequences to your economic activity and family welfare, with 0 
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indicating an extremely bad year and 10 indicating and extremely good year. Please also 
indicate the main reason for thisbelow. 
 
47. Flood 2011 
Very 
bad 
         Very 
good 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
[Enumerator: ask the following question if response is from 0 to 9] 
If the year was not very good, what were the main reasons for this? Please cross one or more 
of the reasons below: 
1 =  water too high 
2 = water too low 
3 = flood came too early 
4 = flood lasted too long 
5 = high winds and waves in combination with the flood 
6 = other; pleasespecify __________________________ 
 
48. Flood 2010 
Very 
bad 
         Very 
good 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
[Enumerator: ask the following question if response is from 0 to 9] 
If the year was not very good, what were the main reasons for this? Please cross one or more 
of the reasons below: 
1 =  water too high 
2 = water too low 
3 = flood came too early 
4 = flood lasted too long 
5 = high winds and waves in combination with the flood 
6 = other; please specify __________________________ 
 
49. Flood 2009 
Very 
bad 
         Very 
good 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
[Enumerator: ask the following question if response is from 0 to 9] 
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If the year was not very good, what were the main reasons for this? Please cross one or more 
of the reasons below: 
1 =  water too high 
2 = water too low 
3 = flood came too early 
4 = flood lasted too long 
5 = high winds and waves in combination with the flood 
6 = other; please specify __________________________ 
 
50. Flood 2008 
Very 
bad 
         Very 
good 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
[Enumerator: ask the following question if response is from 0 to 9] 
If the year was not very good, what were the main reasons for this? Please cross one or more 
of the reasons below: 
1 =  water too high 
2 = water too low 
3 = flood came too early 
4 = flood lasted too long 
5 = high winds and waves in combination with the flood 
6 = other; please specify __________________________ 
 
51. Flood 2007 
Very 
bad 
         Very 
good 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
[Enumerator: ask the following question if response is from 0 to 9] 
If the year was not very good, what were the main reasons for this? Please cross one or more 
of the reasons below: 
1 =  water too high 
2 = water too low 
3 = flood came too early 
4 = flood lasted too long 
5 = high winds and waves in combination with the flood 
6 = other; please specify __________________________ 
 
52. Flood 2006 
Very          Very 
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bad good 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
[Enumerator: ask the following question if response is from 0 to 9] 
If the year was not very good, what were the main reasons for this? Please cross one or more 
of the reasons below: 
1 =  water too high 
2 = water too low 
3 = flood came too early 
4 = flood lasted too long 
5 = high winds and waves in combination with the flood 
6 = other; please specify __________________________ 
 
53. Do you believe that the flooding pattern is changing over the last five years, or would you 
rather say that floods are as they always have been? 
 
No change at all        Dramatic change 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
54. Do you believe that the drought pattern is changing over the last five year, or would you 
rather say that droughts are as they always have been? 
No change at all        Dramatic change 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
55. Do you believe that the start of the rainy season has been delayed over the last five year, 
or would you rather say that the starts of the rainy seasons are as they always have been? 
No change at all        Dramatic change 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
56. Do you believe that the rainy season has ended sooner over the last five year, or would 
you rather say that the ends of rainy seasons are as they always have been? 
No change at all        Dramatic change 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
 
57. What adaptation practices have your household made to cope with long term shifts in 
flooding during the last 5 years? 
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Adaptation practices 57.1 Done the 
practices (1=yes, 
0=no) 
57. 2 When have you done 
this practice (year) and 
what did you do 
1. Changed crop variety   
2. Built a water harvesting system   
3. Built higher dykes   
4. Bought insurance   
5. Irrigated more   
6. Changed from crop to livestock   
7. Migrated to another area   
8. Found off-farm jobs   
9. Leased your land   
 
 
58. Last year did you receive information about the forecasted date of onset of the flooding 
season from 
[Enumerator: multiple answer] 
1= yes         0= no government 
1= yes         0= no NGO 
1= yes         0= no farmer's association 
1= yes         0= no lead farmer 
1= yes         0= no peer farmer (neighbor/relative) 
1= yes         0= no media 
 
59. If yes in at least one of the above sources, please indicate on the scale below how 
accurate the forecast was. 
…………. [Enumerator: fill in the name of the organization in the ‘yes’ answer] 
Not accurate at 
all 
       Extremely 
accurate 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
…………. [Enumerator: fill in the name of the organization in the ‘yes’ answer] 
Not accurate at 
all 
       Extremely 
accurate 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
…………. [Enumerator: fill in the name of the organization in the ‘yes’ answer] 
Not accurate at 
all 
       Extremely 
accurate 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
…………. [Enumerator: fill in the name of the organization in the ‘yes’ answer] 
Not accurate at        Extremely 
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all accurate 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
…………. [Enumerator: fill in the name of the organization in the ‘yes’ answer] 
Not accurate at 
all 
       Extremely 
accurate 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
…………. [Enumerator: fill in the name of the organization in the ‘yes’ answer] 
Not accurate at 
all 
       Extremely 
accurate 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
 
60. Please indicate how yourfamily’s livelihood is affected by the following risks.  
Drought…. 
Not at all 
affected 
       Severely 
affected 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
Flood…. 
Not at all 
affected 
       Severely 
affected 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
Early flood… 
Not at all 
affected 
       Severely 
affected 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
Protracted flood … 
Not at all 
affected 
       Severely 
affected 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
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Heavy rainfall … 
Not at all 
affected 
       Severely 
affected 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
Changes in prices of agricultural products … 
Not at all 
affected 
       Severely 
affected 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
Disrupted infrastructure … 
Not at all 
affected 
       Severely 
affected 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
61. In case any heavy flooding should occur which damages houses and production in your 
community, how strongly do you expect that the government will provide relieve? 
Will not help out        Will certainly 
help out 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
62. In case any heavy flooding should occur which damages houses and production in your 
community, how strongly do you expect that NGOs will provide relieve? 
Will not help out        Will certainly 
help out 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
63. In case any heavy flooding should occur which damages houses and production in your 
community, how strongly do you expect that your neighbors/local community will 
provide relieve? 
Will not help out        Will certainly 
help out 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
64. In case any heavy flooding should occur which damages houses and production in your 
community, how strongly do you expect that Buddhist monk will provide relieve? 
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Will not help out        Will certainly 
help out 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
Social capital, insurance and health behavior 
Insurance availability/awareness and health behavior 
65. Do you know or have you heard of any insurance that you could purchase to protect 
yourself against risks associated with flooding and/or drought? Pleasespecifybelow: 
 
1 = I have been approached by someone outside your family 
2 = I have heard about the possibility, but have never been approached personally 
3 = I have never heard about such insurance 
 
66. [Enumerator: ask this question if answer to question above =1]  Who is this person? 
1 = village leader 
2 = insurance agent 
3= friend/neighbor/relatives 
4 = others 
 
67. If you have heard about such insurance or have been approached, please answer the 
following: 
I am insured:      1= yes         0= no 
 
68. Please provide details about the  insurance you are insured or you decided not to be 
insured: 
The premium  ………  $ per hectare (in local currency) 
The coverage (please describe)  ………………. 
Other (specify)……………… 
 
69. If you don’t know the premium, how much do you expect for the premium__________ 
 
70. If you have heard about it but are not insured, please indicate the most important reasons 
for this below: 
 
1 = the insurance was too expensive 
2 = I did not have the money at the time/ insufficient funds 
3 = who knows if they are really going to pay in case of damage 
4 = the administrative procedures are too complicated 
5 = I have neighbors/friends/family helping me out, so I do not need insurance 
6 = the insurance offered me was too complicated, I did not understand it 
7 = I felt I did not have enough information about the insurance 
8 = the government would help in case of disaster, so no need for insurance 
9 = I have not thought about it 
10 = I have not had time to think about it 
11= Do not need insurance for other reasons:_________ 
 
71. If you have decide to be insured, please indicate the most important reasons for this 
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below 
          1= the price of the insurance is appropriate. 
          2= the high probability of flood occurring in the future   
          3= the administrative procedures are easy 
          4= this program is carried out by the government, so I trust this program completely 
          5= I will be less worried about the flood if buying the insurance. 
          6 = I feel pressure to buy  
   7=other reasons:_________ 
 
72. Have you bought health insurance last year? 
1 = Yes          go to question 73 
0 = No         go to question 74 
 
73. Please indicate the most important reasons for buying the health insurance: 
          1= the price of the insurance is appropriate. 
          2= the high probability of health problems in the future   
          3= the administrative procedures are easy 
          4= this program is carried out by the government, so I trust this program completely. 
          5= I will be less worried about health problems if buying the insurance. 
          6 = I feel pressure to buy  
   7=other reasons:_________ 
 
74. Please indicate the most important reasons for not buying the health insurance: 
1 = the insurance was too expensive 
2 = I did not have the money at the time/ insufficient funds 
3 = who knows if they are really going to pay in case of sickness 
4 = the administrative procedures are too complicated 
5 = I have neighbors/friends/family helping me out, so I do not need insurance 
6 = the insurance offered me was too complicated, I did not understand it 
7 = I felt I did not have enough information about the insurance 
8 = the government would help in case of sickness, so no need for insurance 
9 = I have not thought about it 
10 = I have not had time to think about it 
11= do not need insurance for other reasons:_________ 
 
75. [Enumerator: ask this question if the family has children] Did your children in your 
family have vaccination in the last three years? 
1 = Yes                             
0 = No      
 
76. Do you smoke? 
1 = Yes                             
0 = No      
 
Social capital 
 
77. If you suddenly needed a small amount of money enough to pay for expenses for your 
household for one week, how many people beyond your immediate household could you 
turn to who would be willing to provide this money? 
1 = No one 
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2 = One or two people 
3 = Three or four people 
4 = Five or more people 
 
Please indicate below how much you trust several institutions, with zero indicating that you 
do not trust them at all, and 10 indicating that you fully trust them: 
 
78. The local authorities: 
Do not trust at all        Fully trust 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
79. Flood warnings: 
Do not trust at all        Fully trust 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
80. NGOs: 
Do not trust at all        Fully trust 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
81. Banks and micro-insurance: 
Do not trust at all        Fully trust 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
82. Insurance companies: 
Do not trust at all        Fully trust 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
83. My neighbors: 
Do not trust at all        Fully trust 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
84. My family: 
Do not trust at all        Fully trust 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
85. Budhist Monk: 
Do not trust at all        Fully trust 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
Are you a member in any local NGOs 
Group 86. Membership 
(1=yes, 0= 
no) 
87. Please rank the importance of 
the group for your household 
in general (rank 1 to 3, where 
1 is the most important) 
88. Are you an active 
member 
(1=active, 0=not, 
2= passive) 
Religious or 
spiritual 
   
Red Cross    
Veteran’s 
Association 
   
Women’s 
Union 
   
Youth Union    
Peasants 
Association 
   
Elderly 
Association 
   
Savings groups    
Others    
 
89. How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully willing to take risks or 
do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale below, where 0 means 
“risk averse” and 10 means “fully prepared to take risks”:  
 
Risk averse        Fully prepared 
to take risks 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
90. People can often behave differently in different situations. Please indicate your 
willingness to take risks for each of the areas indicated below: 
 Risk averse        Fully prepared to 
take risks 
- in financialmatters 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
-withyourhealth? O O O O O O O O O O O 
-withyourfamily'shealth? O O O O O O O O O O O 
- for work? O O O O O O O O O O O 
-In agriculturalproduction? O O O O O O O O O O O 
-with respect to my house and 
possessions? 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
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91. Imagine when you harvest, a middleman approaches and offers a term of payment that 
you agree on. You could obtain either a delayed paymentsix months from now, or a 
different smaller amount immediately. There is no risk involved—both amounts will be 
paid out for sure. Please indicate below instead of receiving a delayed payment of 800 
EUR six months from now, which is the smallest amount that you would need to be paid 
right now. 
 
I would need to be given _____________Dong right now to give up the payment of 800 EUR 
six months from now. 
 
92. Imagine when you harvest, a middleman approaches and offers a term of payment that 
you agree on. You could obtain either a delayed payment one year from now, or a 
different smaller amount six months from now. There is no risk involved—both amounts 
will be paid out for sure. Please indicate below instead of receiving a delayed payment of 
800 EUR one year from now, which is the smallest delayed payment that you would need 
to be paid six months from now. 
 
I would need to be given _____________Dong six months from now to give up the payment 
of 800 EUR one year from now. 
 
Happiness 
 
93. How satisfied are you today with the following areas of your life? Please answer by using 
the following scale:   0 means “totally unhappy”,  10 means “totally happy” 
   Totally unhappy  Totally happy 
How satisfied are you with 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
– yourhealth O O O O O O O O O O O 
–  yoursleep O O O O O O O O O O O 
– yourwork O O O O O O O O O O O 
– yourincome O O O O O O O O O O O 
–  yourdwelling O O O O O O O O O O O 
– yourfreetime O O O O O O O O O O O 
– yourfamily O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
 
94. In conclusion, we would like to ask you about your satisfaction with your life in general.  
Pleaseansweraccordingto the followingscale: 
 
0 means“completely dissatisfied” and 10 means “completely satisfied” 
 
How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered? 
Completely 
dissatisfied 
       Completely 
satisfied 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
O O O O O O O O O O O 
 
 
48
19 
 
Ask these following questions if the household is cultivating rice 
 
95. Where do your paddy fields locate? 
1 = All my paddy fields are outside the dike system 
2 = All my paddy fields are inside the dike system 
3 = Part of my paddy fields are outside the dike______ (ha) and a part is inside_____(ha) 
 
96. Last year, how many crops did your household cultivate and what were the yields? 
 Inside the dike system Outside the dike system 
 Crop (1 = 
yes, 0 = 
no) 
Size (ha) Total yield 
(ha) 
Crop (1 = 
yes, 0 = 
no) 
Size (ha) Total yield 
(ha) 
Winter - 
Spring 
      
Summer - 
Autumn 
      
Autumn - 
Winter 
      
 
Ask these following questions for those have paddy field outside the dike system 
 
97. What time do you forecast that the first flood will come? ___/______(day/month of the 
lunar calendar) 
 
98. What probability do you think that this year flood will come before you harvest the 
Summer - Autumn crop? _________% 
 
99. Do you decide to invest the Summer – Autumn crop? 1 = yes         0 = no 
 
100. When you decide whether to invest in the Summer – Autumn crop, do you consult your 
fellow farmers? 
1 = yes, my decision is affected by them   
0 = no, I decideindependently 
 
101. When you decide whether to invest in the Summer – Autumn crop, do you consult the 
local government? 
1 = yes, my decision is affected by them   
0 = no, I decideindependently 
 
102. If you decide not to invest in the Summer Autumn crop, how do you use your land? 
1 = let it idle 
2 = rent it out with price _______ thousand dong/ha 
3 = other _________________ 
 
Technology adoption 
103. In the current Winter – Spring crop, did you change rice varieties? 
1 = yes, from __________to ______________ 
0 = no  
 
104. Have your household participated in the following programs?\ 
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Program Participation Which 
years? 
Produce and use Green fungus (Mo hinh nhan nuoi 
nam xanh tai nong ho) 
1 = yes   0 = no  
Water saving technique (Tuoi tiet kiem nuoc tren lua) 1 = yes   0 = no  
One must five reduction (Chuong trinh 1 phai 5 
giam) 
1 = yes   0 = no  
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